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REALISM, REFERENCE AND GRUE (WHY METAPHYSICAL REALISM CANNOT SOLVE THE GRUE PARADOX) PDF Print E-mail
Written by MARY KATE MCGOWAN   

ABSTRACT. Although metaphysical realism affords objective kinds, it cannot afford an objectivist solution to the grue paradox. Since a subjectivist solution to the grue paradox has such powerful non-realist consequences, a MRist may well wish to avoid those consequences (one must afford an objective distinction between the inductively appropriate properties and all the rest). There are a variety of ways that this may be done.

 
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