ABSTRACT. This essay provides an elementary, unified introduction to the models of market institutions that go beyond the competitive model of price-taking behavior on both sides of the market. Several models of market institutions that govern price determination are explored and compared, including contracting, posted prices, bilateral bargaining, middlemen, and auctions. While equilibrium models still do not capture the full possibilities for market behavior, modeling specific market institutions reduces the level of abstraction inherent in the standard competitive model. (pp. 210–236)

JEL: D40, E02, L22, P48

Keywords: market, institution, price, equilibrium, behavior, model 

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
University of California-Santa Cruz

Home | About Us | Events | Our Team | Contributors | Peer Reviewers | Editing Services | Books | Contact | Online Access

© 2009 Addleton Academic Publishers. All Rights Reserved.

Joomla templates by Joomlashine