ABSTRACT. I draw on Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016), D’Agostino et al. (2016), and You (2015) to illustrate my arguments concerning the institutional economics of public sector reform and its relationship with corruption. Corruption confines growth and suppresses confidence in government, whereas low growth and skepticism of the state invigorate and substantiate corruption. Corruption is adverse for economic and social advancement, and is likely to raise preferentiality.
JEL codes: D73; D72; L22; L25

Keywords: government effectiveness; corruption; public sector reform

How to cite: Ionescu, Luminita (2017). “Government Effectiveness in Controlling Corruption: What’s New?,” Economics, Management, and Financial Markets 12(3): 76–81.

Received 28 November 2016 • Received in revised form 17 June 2017
Accepted 19 June 2017 • Available online 27 August 2017

doi:10.22381/EMFM12320176