ABSTRACT. In the present paper, I focus on Ryle’s understanding of the self-intimating theory of consciousness, his attempt to debunk skepticism, and his conceptual analysis of “mind.” Ryle holds that trueness and falseness, and correctness and incorrectness must be qualities or properties resident in the propositions which they characterize: the trueness or correctness of predictions and guesses must be features or properties which belong all the time to their possessors. There are infinitely many cases of one truth making necessary the truth of another proposition. pp. 146–151

Keywords: Ryle, logical behaviorism, self-intimating theory of consciousness


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