ABSTRACT. I distinguish 20th century Constructivists (e.g. Goodman, Putnam) whose anti-Realism is global and is motivated by epistemic and semantic concerns about Realism from 21st century Constructivists (e.g. Einheuser, Goswick, Sidelle) whose anti-Realism is local and is motivated by specific metaphysical concerns about modality. I argue that the 21st century Constructivist program is plausible in a way the 20th century Constructivist program is not. In particular, I argue that 21st century Constructivism is immune to the anti-Constructivist arguments Devitt presents in Truth and Realism.

Keywords: metaphysics; constructivism; realism; Devitt; Putnam; Sidelle

How to cite: Goswick, Dana (2019). “A Devitt-Proof Constructivism,” Analysis and Metaphysics 18: 7–14. doi:10.22381/AM1820191

Received 26 January 2018 • Received in revised form 20 February 2018
Accepted 20 February 2018 • Available online 10 March 2018