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ABSTRACT: When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.

Keywords: philosophy of language; causal theory; Kripke; meaning skepticism; meaning; reference

How to cite: Douglas, Samuel Paul (2018). “The Qua-Problem and Meaning Scepticism,” Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 17: 71–78.

Received 24 July 2017 • Received in revised form 6 September 2017
Accepted 7 September 2017 • Available online 29 September 2017

doi:10.22381/LPI1720184

SAMUEL PAUL DOUGLAS
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School of Humanities and Social Science,
University of Newcastle

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