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ABSTRACT. Kripke has argued that names are rigid designators, and that a name's reference is determined by a causal chain of a certain kind that connects an object with the name's use, thus making the name this object's name. He has not shown that there is a logical connection between these two theses of him. The purpose of the paper is to establish such a connection. It argues that on the assumption that names refer to objects in possible worlds other than the ones in which they are used, the causal theory of names entails the thesis that names are rigid designators.

 

HILLA JACOBSON
Ben-Gurion University
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