ABSTRACT. Alvin Plantinga (2006) presents an argument against materialism that is concerned with intentionality. His main contention is that according to materialism, intentionality is not a basic property of the brain or of any part thereof, and that intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among various physical items. I take issues with the latter claim, and argue that there is no reason to think that intentionality cannot be thus determined. I also suggest that Plantinga’s failure is anything but accidental: the phenomenon of intentionality is neutral with respect to the mind-body problem. pp. 113–120

Keywords: materialism, dualism, content, intentionality, indication,
original intentionality, derived intentionality


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