ABSTRACT. I criticize all four of Lewis's objections to a Meinongian theory of fiction, suggesting that they can be answered or refuted, thereby blunting Lewis's charge that a Meinongian semantics is at a theoretical disadvantage in comparison with his modal story-contexting. Lewis-style modal story-contexting, moreover, is not incompatible with a Meinongian logic of fiction. By itself, without Meinongian object theory, Lewis's proposal moreover is subject to equally powerful countercriticisms. Some version of Lewis-style story-contexting needs to be combined with a Meinongian semantics of fiction in order to avoid Lewis's objections to Meinongian object theory, and to avoid Meinongian objections to Lewis's story-context-prefixing.



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